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Gideon Parchomovsky* and Alex Stein**
N this Article we introduce a model of copyright law that calibrates 
authors’ rights and liabilities to the level of originality in their works. 
We advocate this model as a substitute for the extant regime that un-
justly and inefficiently grants equal protection to all works satisfying the 
“modicum of creativity” standard. Under our model, highly original 
works will receive enhanced protection and their authors will also be 
sheltered from suits by owners of preexisting works. Conversely, au-
thors of less original works will receive diminished protection and incur 
greater exposure to copyright liability. We operationalize this proposal 
by designing separate rules for highly original works, for works exhibit-
ing average originality, and for works that are minimally original or 
unoriginal. We illustrate our rules’ application by showing how they 




“[T]o make the copyright turnstile revolve, the author should 
have to deposit more than a penny in the box . . . .” 
Benjamin Kaplan1
INTRODUCTION 
 Originality is the sine qua non of copyrightability. A work must 
be original to receive copyright protection. Yet, it is a very minimal 
requirement.2 To prove originality, an author needs to show that 
*  Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Bar-Ilan University Faculty of 
Law, Israel. 
**  George W. Crawford Visiting Professor of Law, Yale Law School. Professor of 
Law, Cardozo Law School. We thank Barton Beebe, Abraham Bell, Ben Depoorter, 
Bob Ellickson, Jim Gibson, Bobbi Kwall, and Peter Siegelman for insightful discus-
sions and comments, and Taly Dvorkis and Lital Helman for superb research assis-
tance. 
 1 An Unhurried View of Copyright 46 (1967). 
2 See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) (“Person-
ality. . . . expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art 
has in it something irreducible, which is one man’s alone. That something he may 
copyright . . . .”) (Holmes, J.). 
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the expression for which protection is sought originated with her 
and was not copied from someone else. Once this showing is made, 
an author only needs to demonstrate that her expression contains a 
modicum of creativity3 and that it was fixed in a tangible medium 
of expression4 in order to enjoy the full panoply of exclusive rights 
and benefits under copyright law. Protection is granted indiscrimi-
nately to all expressive works, whether highly or only minimally 
original.5
Copyright law fails to take the next step and calibrate the scope 
of the copyright protection to the degree of the work’s originality. 
Originality under the extant regime is a mere threshold require-
ment, and, moreover, one that can be easily satisfied.6 The problem 
with the existing design is that by rewarding minimally original 
works and highly original works alike, the law incentivizes authors 
to produce works containing just enough originality to receive pro-
tection—but not more. This result is neither efficient nor just. 
Whether one subscribes to utilitarian theories of copyright law or 
to desert-based justifications, it appears that identical treatment of 
all works, regardless of the level of originality, is a misguided idea. 
From an efficiency perspective, the current approach incentivizes 
production of too many works at the low end of the originality 
spectrum and a suboptimal number of truly original works.7 From a 
3  See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (“Original, 
as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created 
by the author . . . and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.”). 
4 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (making eligible for copyright protection any origi-
nal work of authorship “fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or 
later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise commu-
nicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device”). 
5 We believe that owners of unoriginal works would suffer lesser damage from copy-
right infringements. The prospect of lesser damage could potentially increase an in-
fringer’s chances to defeat the owner’s suit by the “fair use” defense. Cf. Harper & 
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (observing that “‘the 
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work’ . . . is 
undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use”). While this factor could 
mitigate the overbreadth of copyright protection, it does so haphazardly and in a very 
limited way. 
6 Cf. Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 Duke L.J. 683, 704–16 
(2003) (rationalizing the minimalist originality requirement as a cost-saving eviden-
tiary device that allows courts to deny protection to works not exhibiting distinctive-
ness that makes it easy to establish copying). 
7 For discussion, see infra Part II. 
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fairness perspective, the distortion may be even greater as the just 
reward of authors who made a significant contribution to society is 
supposed to be much greater than for those who made a relatively 
insignificant contribution.8
In this Article we set out to design a workable copyright system 
that calibrates authors’ protection and liability to the originality 
level of their works.9 We do not propose to revamp the current 
definition of originality. We accept the two constituent elements of 
that definition—independent creation by the author and creativ-
ity—but treat them as continuums, rather than thresholds, and then 
vary the rules of copyright protection and liability in accordance 
with the degree of creativity of works. Under our proposed design, 
authors of highly original works will not only receive greater pro-
tection, but will also be sheltered from liability if sued for in-
fringement by owners of preexisting works. Conversely, creators of 
minimally original works will receive little protection and incur 
greater exposure to liability if sued by others. 
To operationalize our vision of copyright law, we introduce three 
legal mechanisms that combine substantive standards with eviden-
tiary rules. Although each of our mechanisms is designed differ-
ently, they all share the common goal of inducing creation of origi-
nal expression, either by rewarding authors of highly creative 
works or by penalizing authors of minimally original or completely 
unoriginal ones. 
Our first mechanism is called “the doctrine of inequivalents” and 
is designed to afford the maximum degree of protection to excep-
tionally original works. Authors of works that incorporate uniquely 
high originality and creativity will not only receive the maximum 
8 For discussion of this idea, see infra Part II. 
9 For a more restrictive approach that imports the patent law nonobviousness re-
quirement into copyright law, see Joseph Scott Miller, Hoisting Originality, 32 Car-
dozo L. Rev. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1361040. For discussions of this proposal, see Justin Hughes, 
Should Copyright’s Originality Standard be Sort-of Non-obviousness? 2 (Apr. 5, 
2009) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://blog.richmond.edu/ipi/article-
1/commentators/); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Hoisting Originality: A Response 1 
(Apr. 2009) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://blog.richmond.edu/ipi/article-
1/commentators/); see also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Originality in Context, 44 Hous. 
L. Rev. 871, 874 (2007) (analyzing the relationship between the minimalist originality 
standard of copyright law and moral rights). 
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possible copyright protection, but will also be sheltered from liabil-
ity for infringing the works of others. 
Our second mechanism, “the added value doctrine,” will govern 
infringement actions involving works of standard or average origi-
nality. It will require courts to compare the relative originality of 
the plaintiff’s work with that of the defendant. If a court deter-
mines that the original contribution of the defendant is equal to or 
greater than that of the plaintiff, the plaintiff will be denied injunc-
tive relief and be awarded market value compensation instead. 
This remedial shift from injunctions to damages10 is designed to 
balance the competing demands of works of average originality by 
ensuring that original works are not suppressed from the market. 
Our third and final mechanism, “the sameness rule,” will regu-
late copyright conflicts that involve minimally original or non-
original works. The rule will create a rebuttable presumption of 
copying when an allegedly infringing work containing minimal 
originality is substantively similar to the plaintiff’s work. The pre-
sumption will be removed if the defendant successfully shows in-
dependent creation or the existence of a prior common source 
from which both works are borrowed. 
As we will demonstrate, implementation of our proposed me-
chanisms will increase the benefits and reduce the costs associated 
with copyright protection. By putting a positive and a negative pre-
mium on originality, our framework will encourage creators to fo-
cus on the original content of their works and thereby enhance 
their contributions to society. At the same time, our proposal will 
also scale back the protection currently granted to multiple existing 
works and by so doing will clear the path for future creativity. In-
deed, we will show how our mechanisms could have altered the 
analysis of classic copyright cases in a way that might have benefit-
ted society. 
It should be emphasized that in designing our mechanisms, we 
were mindful of the constraints faced by adjudicators and were 
10 The classic taxonomy of Calabresi and Melamed would categorize this shift as a 
substitution of the property-rule protection for a liability rule. See Guido Calabresi & 
A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View 
of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1092–93, 1105–07 (1972). For a detailed dis-
cussion of the possibility and desirability of such substitutions, see Abraham Bell & 
Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 59–64 (2002). 
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therefore careful to craft them in a way that will enable their use in 
practice. Hence, the adoption of our framework will not require 
adjudicators to make determinations they do not make already, 
nor will it require them to opine on the inherent value of art and 
expression more than they do so now. 
Structurally, the Article unfolds in three parts. In Part I, we will 
discuss the overbreadth problem of the extant copyright regime 
and its adverse effect on future creativity. We will show that over 
time the protection accorded to existing authors has become exces-
sive to the point that it threatens to undermine copyright law’s very 
goal of underwriting a rich expressive domain. In Part II, we will 
make the theoretical case for a copyright system that correlates 
protection and liability to works’ originality. We posit that both ef-
ficiency and fairness-based justifications support this vision. We 
will also identify possible objections to this vision of copyright law 
and demonstrate that these objections are not compelling. We will 
then specify the design principles that should guide policymakers in 
creating an originality-based copyright law. Finally, in Part III, we 
will introduce our specific mechanisms for reforming copyright law, 
explain how they can be implemented in practice, and demonstrate 
their superiority over the existing legal rules and adjudicatory 
tools.  
I. COPYRIGHT’S OVERBREADTH 
In assessing the breadth, or strength, of a property regime, it is 
important to pay heed to four distinct aspects of the problem. First, 
one must look at the rules governing acquisition of rights. Second, 
one must analyze the scope of rights (or dominion) of the owner. 
Third, one must examine the ease with which the owner may suc-
cessfully assert her rights against others. Finally, one must consider 
the remedies the law grants to an owner whose rights have been 
violated. Looking at copyright law from this perspective reveals 
that right-holders enjoy very broad protection on each dimension 
and even more so in the aggregate. 
Begin with the rules of acquisition. Copyrights may well be the 
easiest property rights to acquire. Copyright law sets two main pre-
requisites for acquisition of rights: the work in which rights are 
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sought must be original and must be fixed in a tangible medium of 
expression.11 Both requirements set a very low threshold for obtain-
ing protection, even in combination. The originality requirement 
demands that the person seeking copyright protection originated 
the work. Restated in the negative, originality requires that a per-
son wishing to obtain rights in a work of expression did not copy 
the work from someone else. In the landmark decision Feist v. Ru-
ral,12 the Supreme Court raised the originality bar somewhat by in-
terpreting the requirement to incorporate a demand for “a modi-
cum of creativity.”13 Therefore, to satisfy the requirement after 
Feist, an author needs to show that she composed her work and 
that it contains a minimal amount of creativity. 
The fixation requirement is even easier to meet. Under the 
Copyright Act, fixation does not require a specific form: any physi-
cal embodiment satisfies the requirement. Furthermore, the law 
does not require a permanent or even long-lasting fixation. Quite 
the contrary, even temporary or transient fixation that lasts for a 
very brief period of time will suffice. For example, in MAI v. 
Peak,14 the Ninth Circuit ruled that a temporary copy of a program, 
generated by turning a computer on, qualifies as fixation under the 
Copyright Act, even though the copy vanishes once the computer 
is turned off.15
It should be noted that originality and fixation, the “gatekeep-
ers” of copyright law, fall short of the “gatekeepers” employed by 
patent law. Patent law requires inventions to be useful, novel, and 
nonobvious to “a person having ordinary skill in the art.”16 The use-
fulness requirement ensures that the claimed invention succeeds in 
11 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
12 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
13 Id. at 346. 
14 MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993). 
15 Id. at 518 (“[B]y showing that Peak loads the software into the RAM and is then 
able to view the system error log and diagnose the problem with the computer, MAI 
has adequately shown that the representation created in the RAM is ‘sufficiently 
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
cated for a period of more than transitory duration.’”). 
16 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006); see also Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the 
Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 839, 844 (1990) (“To be pat-
entable an invention must meet all the statutory requirements for patentability: nov-
elty, utility and non-obviousness.”). 
PARCHOMOVSKY&STEIN_BOOK 9/17/2009  5:37 PM 
2009] Originality 1511 
 
attaining the goal or function described in the application.17 The 
novelty requirement prescribes that an invention must be new in 
order to qualify for patent protection.18 Finally, the nonobviousness 
requirement obliges an inventor to prove that her innovation 
marks a non-trivial improvement over the prior art.19 Unlike copy-
right law, patent law requires inventions to undergo examination to 
ensure compliance with the statutory prerequisites prior to the 
grant of protection. Copyright law never incorporated an examina-
tion process and, strictly speaking, even registration is not required 
to secure protection.20 It should be noted here that copyrights are 
rights in rem that avail against the rest of the world. Their recogni-
tion is not cost free.21 As rights in rem, copyrights impose a duty on 
all members of our society to comply with the rights of the holder. 
This effect is of particular note in a democratic society since copy-
17 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); see also In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). Additionally, the invention must be workable, since inoperative or nonsensical 
inventions will not be considered useful. See CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int’l Corp., 349 
F.3d 1333, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
18 See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006); see also Richard A. Mann et al., Starting from Scratch: 
A Lawyer’s Guide to Representing a Start-Up Company, 56 Ark. L. Rev. 773, 785 
(2004) (“The novelty requirement means that the invention must be new and not pre-
viously patented, described, or otherwise anticipated.”); David W. Opderbeck, Patent 
Damages Reform and the Shape of Patent Law, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 127, 168 (2009) (ex-
plaining that an invention “is non-obvious only if, given the state of all the relevant 
prior art at the time of the invention, a person of ordinary skill in the art would con-
sider the invention non-obvious” and that “the patent examiner or the court is re-
quired to put itself into the shoes of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of 
the invention in order to make the . . . determination . . . of the claimed invention’s 
‘specific contribution’ over the prior art”). 
19 See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966) 
(“Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differ-
ences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level 
of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obvious-
ness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. Such secondary consid-
erations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., 
might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the sub-
ject matter sought to be patented.”); see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 
398, 415–26 (2007) (applying Graham’s criteria and invalidating patent on obvious-
ness grounds). 
20 See 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2006). Registration of copyrights still provides owners 
with practical advantages. See infra note 50. 
21 Cf. James Wilson, Could there be a Right to Own Intellectual Property?, 28 L. & 
Phil. 393 (2009) (demonstrating that the moral case for recognizing intellectual prop-
erty ownership is also far from obvious). 
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rights constrain others’ freedom of expression. Furthermore, since 
copyright law grants owners exclusive rights it raises the specter of 
monopolistic pricing. As a result, certain users who value works at 
more than their competitive price, but are unwilling or unable to 
pay the right-holder’s extortionary premium, will not acquire the 
works. Finally, copyrights also generate enforcement costs. Some 
of these costs are borne by the copyright holders themselves, but 
others are shouldered by society. The state puts its law enforce-
ment machinery—courts, agencies, and the police—at the disposal 
of copyright holders in order to help them vindicate their rights 
and generate deterrence against putative infringers. 
As far as the aspect of dominion is concerned, copyright law 
grants to authors six exclusive rights in their works. Section 106 of 
the Copyright Act confers upon authors the right of reproduction, 
adaptation, distribution, public performance, public display, and 
digital performance (in the case of sound recordings).22 These ex-
clusive rights do not exhaust all possible uses of expressive works: 
for example, one can freely perform a work privately or consume a 
work by reading or listening to it. Yet, they do put a very wide 
range of activities under the exclusive control of the copyright 
owner.23
To be sure, the Act also sets certain limitations on the dominion 
of the owner. But the limitations are either very narrow and speci-
fic24 or very vague and complex.25 As Professor James Gibson re-
22 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
23 Id. 
24 Such narrow exceptions include, inter alia, the use of copyrighted works in the 
framework of nonprofit, face-to-face teaching events, nonprofit informative religious 
services, or public broadcasts for the blind. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 110 (2006). 
25 For example, 17 U.S.C. § 107 defines a general exception for the “fair use” of 
copyrighted works, which requires courts to employ a balancing test that includes four 
specific factors. The scope and limits of the fair use standard have been subject to 
various debates and criticism owing mainly to the doctrine’s lack of clarity. See, e.g., 
Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 
156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549, 549–50 (2008) (describing the fair use doctrine as enigmatic 
and developing an empirical account of its applications by courts); see also Lawrence 
Lessig, Free Culture 187 (2004) (“[F]air use in America simply means the right to hire 
a lawyer . . . .”); Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 
Va. L. Rev. 1483, 1484–91 (2007) (attesting that applications of the fair use doctrine 
are unpredictable and proposing establishment of nonexclusive bright-line rules that 
will define per se fair uses); cf. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006) (stating the complex mecha-
nisms for compulsory licenses). 
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cently noted, the architecture of rights and limitations in the Copy-
right Act—in combination with the ease of suing infringers and the 
remedies provided by the Act, which we discuss below—generates 
an unceasing dynamic of expansion of the copyright holders’ do-
minion at the expense of users.26 Specifically, Gibson demonstrated 
that the vagueness of the various limitations and defenses gener-
ated a high degree of uncertainty among users regarding the scope 
and content of their privileges, which in turn prompted them to pay 
copyright owners a license fee rather than risk litigation.27
Copyrights are also limited in time.28 But the current protection 
term—life of the author plus 70 years—gives copyright owners at 
least 99.8% of the value they could extract if the protection were to 
last in perpetuity.29 Furthermore, as life expectancy increases, so 
will the term of the protection. Finally, there is always a possibility 
that Congress will decide to extend the term as it has several times 
in the past.30 Hence, the finite duration proviso is no longer a mean-
ingful limitation on the dominion of copyright owners, and in the 
future it may become virtually irrelevant—if it has not become so 
already. 
Let us turn to the third aspect: the ease with which copyright 
owners can vindicate their rights against putative infringers. Here, 
too, copyright law favors plaintiffs. To succeed in an infringement 
suit, a plaintiff needs to show copying and improper appropriation 
by the defendant. The terminology, however, is misleading. Impor-
tantly, courts do not require plaintiffs to prove actual copying. In-
stead, courts use access and similarity as proxies for copying. Ac-
cordingly, in order to prevail in an infringement suit, the plaintiff 
needs to show that the defendant had access to her work and that 
there are similarities between the two works. Access in copyright 
infringement actions is typically proved by circumstantial evidence. 
If the plaintiff’s work achieved commercial success, or was widely 
26 See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property 
Law, 116 Yale L.J. 882, 884 (2007). 
27 Id. at 887–906. 
28 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006). 
29 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 255–56 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
30 Congress extended the duration of copyrights in several instances, principally in 
1831, 1909, 1976, and 1998. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 192, 222 (2003) (dismissing consti-
tutional challenges to the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998). 
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disseminated, access will be inferred.31 Furthermore, copyright li-
ability does not depend on the mental state of the defendant. Inno-
cent copying and even subconscious copying suffice to give rise to 
liability.32 Copyright law thus effectively establishes a strict liability 
regime.33
The plaintiff also must prove improper appropriation. This re-
quires the plaintiff to show that the defendant borrowed protected 
elements from her work. This showing is necessary to ensure that 
the similarity between the two works is not due to the presence of 
the same unprotected elements in both works. On its face, the un-
lawful appropriation inquiry may appear to be an important check 
on the power of copyright owners to bring infringement suits 
against others. The unlawful appropriation requirement, however, 
does not raise a significant bar for plaintiffs. As one commentator 
observed, “new creative works almost invariably borrow from old 
creative works, which raises the possibility of infringement on the 
part of the borrower.”34
As for the fourth and final aspect, remedies, copyright law fur-
nishes an impressive array of remedies to successful plaintiffs, in-
cluding injunctions and supra-compensatory damages.35 Courts also 
have broad discretion to issue preliminary injunctions.36 While pre-
liminary injunctions are difficult to secure in other contexts, courts 
tend to grant them as a matter of course in copyright infringement 
cases without requiring a showing of irreparable harm, so long as 
the plaintiff can demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.37 
The ease with which preliminary injunctions are issued in copyright 
infringement cases is highly significant since most cases do not go 
31 Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 482–83 (9th Cir. 2000). 
32 Id. at 482–85 (affirming imposition of liability for subconscious copying); Bright 
Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, 420 F. Supp. 177, 180–81 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) 
(holding George Harrison liable for subconsciously infringing the copyright in the 
plaintiff’s song). For criticism, see Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, The Freedom to Copy: 
Copyright, Creation and Context, 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 477, 531–39 (2007). 
33 See, e.g., David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 139, 152 
(2009) (“Direct copyright infringement remains a strict liability offense, and even a 
relatively minor unauthorized use can result in major liability if the owner has regis-
tered the work and chooses to claim statutory damages.”). 
34 Gibson, supra note 26, at 887. 
35 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502–505 (2006). 
36 Id.  § 502. 
37 Gibson, supra note 26, at 890. 
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beyond this stage. Faced with a preliminary injunction, most de-
fendants elect not to proceed with the trial and choose to settle the 
case instead.38
In addition, the Copyright Act allows successful plaintiffs to col-
lect both the compensation for the losses they suffered as a result 
of the infringement,39 as well as the defendants’ profits.40 In the al-
ternative, the Act entitles plaintiffs to seek statutory damages 
without proof of harm. The Act prescribes that statutory damages 
must range from $750 to $150,000 per work infringed, while leaving 
courts the discretion to set the actual amount based on the circum-
stances of the case.41 Finally, the Act authorizes courts to order the 
impounding and destruction of infringing articles.42
In light of this analysis, it is not at all surprising that many copy-
right scholars believe that copyright protection goes overboard.43 
Indeed, there is virtual consensus among theorists that copyright 
law offers excessive protection to existing authors and does so at 
the expense of future creators. Professor Yochai Benkler, for ex-
ample, has decried the “enclosure movement” in copyright law, 
pointing out that many uses of expressive works that were consid-
ered legitimate in the past can no longer be carried out without 
permission from the right-holder.44 Referring to the same dynamic, 
Professor Pamela Samuelson colorfully termed it the “copyright 
grab.”45 Moreover, Professor Lawrence Lessig cautioned that if the 
38 Id. at 944–45. Gibson notes that plaintiffs take advantage of courts’ willingness to 
issue preliminary injunctions in order to “keep[] cases from reaching a substantive 
ruling that might clarify feedback-fueling gray areas.” Id. 
39 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2006). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. § 504(c)(1)–(2). If the infringement is not willful, the maximum amount a 
plaintiff can collect is $30,000. Id. § 504(c)(1). The minimum damage award for good-
faith infringements is $200. Id. § 504(c)(2). 
42 Id. § 503. 
43 See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox 54–80 (2008) (discussing 
“copyright’s ungainly expansion”); Jessica Litman, Billowing White Goo, 31 Colum. 
J.L. & Arts 587, 587 (2008) (attesting that rights granted by copyright law underwent 
extraordinary expansion over the past fifty years); John Tehranian, Infringement Na-
tion: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm Gap, 2007 Utah L. Rev. 537, 543–48 
(2007) (attesting that copyright protection and liability for copyright infringement are 
excessive). 
44 Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints 
on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354, 354–60 (1999). 
45 Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, Wired, Jan. 1996, at 134. 
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trend of expansion in copyright law is not arrested, it will put fu-
ture creativity at risk.46 Finally, Siva Vaidhyanathan best captured 
the essence of the problem when he concluded that “[copyright] 
law has lost sight of its original charge: to encourage creativity, sci-
ence, and democracy. . . . [it] rewards works already created and 
limits works yet to be created.”47
In the next Part, we develop a proposal to redesign copyright law 
in a way that fixes this defect. Specifically, we make a case for a 
copyright regime that correlates authors’ protection and potential 
liability to the level of originality and creativity in their works. We 
demonstrate that our proposal has the potential not only to remedy 
the overbreadth problem that currently plagues copyright law, but 
also to enhance the originality and creativity of expressive works 
and thus enrich the domains of art, culture, and technology. 
II. ORIGINALITY-BASED COPYRIGHTS 
In this Part, we lay out a normative case for correlating copyright 
protection and liability with the originality of works of authorship. 
We submit that originality-based copyright law can curtail the 
overbreadth problem we discussed in Part I, as well as improve the 
utility and fairness of the current regime. 
Our definition of originality is qualitatively similar to that used 
by the courts. Originality subsists in independently created expres-
sive elements and embodies a demand for a certain level of creativ-
ity. Rather than a threshold requirement, we conceive of originality 
as a continuum and set out to redesign copyright law in accordance 
with this vision. We argue that a high level of originality should en-
title the author to a higher degree of protection against unauthor-
ized uses, as well as shelter her, to varying degrees, against liability 
for borrowing from others. Conversely, a low originality level 
should qualify authors to minimal protection under the Copyright 
Act and expose them to enhanced liability if they borrowed from 
preexisting works.48
46 Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected 
World (2001).  
47 Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Prop-
erty and How it Threatens Creativity 4 (2001). 
48 Cf. Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 
285, 288–90 (2008) (conceptualizing tort liability rules as taxes and subsidies for inno-
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We adopt the originality criterion for a number of reasons. The 
first reason is benefit to society. United States copyright law is 
grounded in utilitarian philosophy. The Intellectual Property 
Clause in the Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for lim-
ited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”49 On this view, copyright pro-
tection is a means to an end. Its raison d’être is to enrich the do-
main of expression and thereby improve the well-being of society. 
Naturally, only original works promote social welfare. Society has 
no interest in protecting unoriginal works that effect no advance-
ments in art, literature, science, education, or other useful endeav-
ors. 
The analysis should not stop here, however. Under the extant 
regime, originality is a mere threshold requirement, and, moreover, 
one that minimally original works satisfy as well. The problem with 
this design is that it fails to differentiate between different levels of 
originality. By rewarding minimally original works and highly origi-
nal works alike, the existing law incentivizes authors to produce 
works containing just enough originality to receive protection, but 
not more. From a societal viewpoint, however, the degree of origi-
nality matters. Presumably, the more original works generate a 
greater benefit for society. Yet, this fact is not embedded in the 
current regime. If society wishes to encourage authors to produce 
highly original works and not settle for the bare minimum neces-
sary to secure protection, it must reflect this preference in the de-
sign of the law. That is, it ought to increase the amount of protec-
tion and decrease the potential liability of authors whose works 
incorporate a high degree of originality. Conversely, it ought to de-
crease the amount of protection and increase the potential liability 
of authors who produce minimally original works. These measures 
will prompt authors to focus on the originality factor, and thereby 
align their private interests with the broader social interest. 
An additional justification for our proposal has to do with cost. 
Copyright protection generates four types of cost. The first type is 
vators, on the one hand, and for replicators and users of conventional knowledge, on 
the other hand, and calling for the removal of rules that chill innovation). 
49 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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the cost of establishing and maintaining a system of copyright pro-
tection. To enable the system to operate, it was necessary to pass 
elaborate legislation that defines the relevant rights, powers, and 
privileges of authors. Then, it became necessary to set up a special 
administrative agency, the Copyright Office, to administer the reg-
istration of rights.50 Like other administrative agencies, the Copy-
right Office is funded by society. Society also bears the cost of 
criminal enforcement against copyright violators51 and of the reso-
lution of private copyright disputes that find their way to the court 
system. 
The second type of cost is monopolistic pricing. At least in some 
cases, copyright law, through its grant of exclusivity, bestows upon 
right-holders enough market power to charge monopolistic supra-
competitive prices.52 As a result, some buyers who would have pur-
50 Although registration is no longer mandatory, it offers three distinct benefits to 
copyright owners. First, it establishes prima facie evidence of the validity of the copy-
right and of the facts stated in the certificate in judicial proceedings. 17 U.S.C. 
§ 410(c) (2006). Second, subject to certain exceptions, it serves as a prerequisite for 
commencing a copyright infringement suit. Id. § 411(a). Third, it serves as a precondi-
tion for awarding statutory damages and attorney’s fees in judicial proceedings, while 
only an award of actual damages and profits is available in the absence of registration. 
Id. § 412. 
51 See, e.g., Id. §§ 506, 1204(a). Congress recently showed an inclination to expand 
criminal liability for copyright violations. See Eric Goldman, Warez Trading and 
Criminal Copyright Infringement, 51 J. Copyright Soc’y USA 395, 396 (2004). This 
development will increase the costs of criminal enforcement. The recent Pro-IP Act, 
officially called the Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property 
Act of 2008, exacerbates those costs by stiffening the penalties for all intellectual 
property violations and by appointing a special “IP Czar” to oversee the enforcement 
of those penalties. Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 17 U.S.C. (2006)). 
52 See, e.g., S.J. Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price Discrimination, 
8 Res. L. & Econ. 181, 184 (1986) (associating copyright ownership with pricing mo-
nopoly); Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 485, 524 
(2004) (explaining that copyright “creates deadweight losses in markets for expres-
sion” because “exclusive rights . . . enable the creator to charge a supracompetitive 
price” and “[c]onsequently, access to the work will be denied to those who value it in 
excess of the competitive price, but less than the supracompetitive price that the mo-
nopolist is able to command”); see also Michael Abramowicz, A Theory of Copy-
right’s Derivative Right and Related Doctrines, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 317, 325-32 (2005) 
(analyzing anti-competitive effects of copyright’s derivative rights and whether the 
rights’ benefits offset those effects); Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Dif-
ferentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 212, 220–24 (2004) (arguing for a “differentiated 
products” model for copyrights as a basis for monopolistic competition). 
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chased copyrighted works at their competitive price must forego 
the transaction and do without the works. 
The third cost is political rent-seeking. This cost is related to, yet 
analytically distinct from, the problem of monopoly. By providing a 
legal structure that allows for supra-competitive profits, copyright 
law creates rents over which various interest groups compete. 
Rent-seeking is an inherently wasteful activity.53 It diverts re-
sources to non-productive uses, such as political lobbying, that of-
ten yield socially suboptimal legislation or regulation.54 Indeed, as 
Professor Jessica Litman has pointed out, interest-group politics 
play a key role in shaping our copyright law,55 and many other 
scholars believe that the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 
was powered through by Disney.56
The fourth and final cost is the adverse impact of copyright on 
future creativity. The magnitude of this cost is a direct function of 
the breadth of copyright protection accorded to existing authors. 
The broader the scope of the protection, the costlier it becomes for 
aspiring authors to produce their works. In a world with extremely 
broad protection, aspiring authors will either have to create com-
pletely original works or secure permission from prior authors. As 
53 See Robert D. Tollison, Rent Seeking: A Survey, 35 Kyklos 575, 576 (1982). 
54 Fred McChesney succinctly described it as “money for nothing.” See Fred S. Mc-
Chesney, Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion 3 
(1997). 
55 See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 Cor-
nell L. Rev. 857, 903 (1987) (claiming that in considering the 1976 Copyright Act, 
Congress relied heavily on industry specialists); Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright 
Law for the Information Age, 75 Or. L. Rev. 19, 22–23 (1996) (demonstrating copy-
right laws’ bias in favor of industry players).  
56 Professor Lessig termed the legislation the “Mickey Mouse Protection Act.” See 
Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 1057, 1065 (2001); 
see also Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright 23 (2001) (describing Disney’s lobbying ef-
fort at protecting Mickey Mouse for an additional twenty years); Lawrence Lessig, 
How I Lost the Big One, Legal Affairs, Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 57, 58; Christopher Sprig-
man, The Mouse that Ate the Public Domain: Disney, The Copyright Term Extension 
Act, and Eldred v. Ashcroft, FindLaw’s Writ, Mar. 5, 2002, http:// 
writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20020305_sprigman.html (“Rather than allow 
Mickey and friends to enter the public domain, Disney and its friends—a group of 
Hollywood studios, music labels, and PACs representing content owners—told Con-
gress that they wanted an extension bill passed. Prompted perhaps by the Disney 
group’s lavish donations of campaign cash—more than $6.3 million in 1997–98, ac-
cording to the nonprofit Center for Responsive Politics—Congress passed and Presi-
dent Clinton signed the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act.”). 
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is the case with any property regime, the need to secure permission 
may give rise to the spectre of holdups. But in the copyright con-
text, a greater problem lurks: the vastness of the universe of copy-
righted works makes it virtually impossible to identify the relevant 
rights-holders and negotiate with them. Worse yet, the same reason 
makes it impracticable for future authors to engage in comprehen-
sive preemption searches, without which they can never be sure 
that their works are completely original. 
Our proposal does not concern the first three costs; it targets the 
fourth. Given the high information costs that exist in the field of 
copyright law,57 the only workable way to afford elbow room for fu-
ture creators is by narrowing copyright protection based on the 
originality criterion. Varying protection based on originality will 
reduce the ability of authors of minimally original works to bring 
infringement suits against subsequent creators. This should help 
clear the path for future authors by lowering the cost of producing 
new works. In property parlance, it may be said that our proposal 
seeks to minimize the blocking effect of prior expressive assets by 
reconfiguring their size.58 Our proposal can also be justified on 
fairness grounds. Economic justifications focus almost invariably 
on individuals’ ex ante incentives for action.59 Fairness-based justi-
fications, in contrast, predominantly take an ex post approach.60 A 
fairness-driven theory that is often invoked to justify copyright pro-
tection focuses on desert. Under this theory, authors deserve to be 
rewarded for their labor and the contribution they made to soci-
57 See Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 Va. L. Rev. 465, 
500–18 (2004) (explaining that copyright law imposes high information costs on po-
tential infringers, but also reduces those costs by allowing independent-creation and 
other defenses to defeat owners’ suits). 
58 See generally Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in 
Three Dimensions, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1015, 1051–53 (2008) (justifying regulation and 
other measures against owner-initiated configurations of assets that impose external-
ities on others).   
59 See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Prop-
erty, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 129, 129–30 (2004); see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 
(1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant 
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by 
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare . . . .”). 
60 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 
Harv. L. Rev. 4, 11 (1984). 
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ety.61 From this perspective, too, an author’s rewards should corre-
late with either her effort or her contribution to society. Awarding 
the same protection to works that are highly original and works 
that exhibit scant originality (or no originality whatsoever) is un-
fair. Allowing authors of minimally original works to block the 
creation of novel works, more original than theirs, is also unjust. 
This unfairness is far from being an unavoidable consequence of 
copyright ownership. The existence and scope of copyright protec-
tion are both matters of social choice, and society should make this 
choice wisely. It can and should condition that protection on the 
size of the benefit that the protected work brings to society. 
A workable originality-based system of copyright protection 
must combine flexibility and commitment. The system’s rules must 
be flexible enough to allow courts to adjust the protection of copy-
righted works to their level of originality. Rigid rules would impair 
the adjudicators’ ability to make these case-specific adjustments. 
Courts’ decisions on copyright liability and remedies cannot be 
completely discretionary, though. The system needs to give authors 
a credible assurance that its protection of copyright on the ground 
will actually correspond to the underlying work’s originality. Fail-
ure to provide this assurance would not allow the system to elimi-
nate the perverse incentives that exist under extant law. 
Our system attains the twin goals of flexibility and commitment 
to originality. It creates a synergy between the substantive stan-
dards of copyright protection and the evidentiary rules that imple-
ment those standards.62 The substantive standards we recommend 
are flexible. They will allow courts to make case-by-case assess-
ments of works’ originality. Evidentiary rules that accompany 
those standards will systematically influence courts’ decisions in fa-
vor of original creators and against authors whose works exhibit 
61 See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 Geo. L.J. 287, 297–
310 (1988) (providing an insightful and comprehensive account of labor-based justifi-
cations of intellectual property); see also Cheryl Swack, Safeguarding Artistic Crea-
tion and the Cultural Heritage: A Comparison of Droit Moral Between France and 
the United States, 22 Colum. J.L. & Arts 361, 361–62 (1998) (discussing artists’ 
“moral rights” in their artwork). 
62 This methodology originates from Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overen-
forcement, 93 Geo. L.J. 1743, 1746 (2005); see also Alex Stein, Foundations of Evi-
dence Law 17–25, 133–53 (2005) (explicating the capacity of evidentiary rules to op-
timize law-enforcement by allocating the risk of error in adjudicative fact-finding). 
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scant or no originality. This skewing will credibly signal the sys-
tem’s commitment to originality. Developers of original works will 
consequently be able to count on and benefit from that commit-
ment. 
Before we introduce our specific mechanisms for improving cop-
yright law, we wish to address two possible objections. The first ob-
jection is predicated on the concern that our proposal may lead to 
excessive originality. This objection questions the utility of legal 
rules designed to induce authors to produce original works. Ar-
guably, those rules may force out excessive originality, which will 
be wasteful or otherwise detrimental to society. 
We do not dispute that originality has an optimal amount. But 
this amount is difficult to ascertain, and our proposed system does 
not even begin to address it. We doubt that anyone can ever iden-
tify the optimal amount of originality in arts and literature. Adop-
tion of this unrealistically perfectionist, if not utopian, criterion for 
reforming copyright law would forestall any attempt at improving 
the law. We take a modest position on the quantum of originality 
issue. We believe that society should reflect its interest in original 
works in the design of copyright law. Our goal is to reduce the ob-
vious distortions that prevent copyright law from achieving its 
stated goals. 
The second objection goes to the practicality of our proposal. In 
an oft-cited paragraph, Justice Holmes cautioned that “[i]t would 
be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to 
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustra-
tions, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”63 Echoing 
Justice Holmes, one may wonder whether judges are qualified to 
implement our proposal. We believe that this concern is misplaced 
for a number of reasons. To begin with, we do not require judges to 
make determinations about the intrinsic value of art, or even what 
constitutes art. Justice Holmes wrote his famous sentence in re-
sponse to Justice Harlan’s opinion stating that advertisements 
should be denied copyright protection because they do not consti-
tute art.64 Our proposal does not touch on that issue. Indeed, we do 
not address this question at all. We clearly do not seek to bar pro-
63 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). 
64 Id. at 253 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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tection to any expressive or art form. Quite the opposite; we accept 
Justice Holmes’ view that the public ought to have the power to 
decide what art is. 
We merely assign courts the task of determining an expressive 
work’s level of originality. Courts are not only capable of perform-
ing this task, but they already do so. Every infringement suit re-
quires the court to identify the original elements in the works in-
volved and decide whether the defendant appropriated original 
expression from the plaintiff’s work.65 Furthermore, whenever a de-
fendant raises a fair use defense, the court must assess the level of 
transformativeness in her work as part of the analysis. In doing so, 
judges assess the level of originality and creativity in the allegedly 
infringing work.66 In appropriate cases, judges can seek assistance 
from expert witnesses in making originality determinations, as they 
do already.67 This means that courts are quite adept at making 
originality determinations and that our proposal will not present 
them with a new challenge. 
III. THE MECHANICS OF ORIGINALITY-BASED COPYRIGHTS 
In this Part, we introduce a set of rules designed to calibrate the 
scope of a work’s protection to its level of originality. Our rules 
have two goals. First, they aim to strengthen the protection granted 
to authors of highly original works by increasing the level of pro-
65 The subtractive approach (an important method for determining unlawful appro-
priation in copyright infringement suits) requires courts to remove from their consid-
eration the unoriginal and other unprotected elements of the plaintiff’s work in order 
to determine whether there is sufficient similarity between the defendant’s work and 
the protectable elements of the plaintiff’s work. See David Nimmer et al., A Structured 
Approach to Analyzing the Substantial Similarity of Computer Software in Copyright 
Infringement Cases, 20 Ariz. St. L.J. 625, 635 (1988); see also Alexander v. Haley, 460 
F. Supp. 40, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding no substantial similarity between the protect-
able, as opposed to non-protectable, elements of the plaintiff’s novel and the defen-
dant’s book). The “Abstract-Filtration-Comparison” test for software-related copy-
right suits also entails assessment of works’ originality. See Computer Assocs. Int’l, 
Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706–12 (2d Cir. 1992). 
66 See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 
1111 (1990) (demonstrating that transformativeness is critical to whether a use “ful-
fill[ed] the objective of copyright law to stimulate creativity” and arguing that creative 
use might be justified despite a copyright owner’s objection). 
67 For one such example, see Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, 420 
F. Supp. 177, 178 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); see also infra note 68.   
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tection to which they will be entitled. Second, they reduce—and, in 
appropriate cases, completely eliminate—those authors’ exposure 
to liability for infringement. Our rules will bring about the opposite 
result for authors of works exhibiting scant originality by scaling 
down their works’ protection correspondingly with the low origi-
nality level. The decrease we propose will not stop at a zero-
protection: authors of completely unoriginal works will receive 
“negative protection” in the form of an increased prospect of copy-
right liability. 
To achieve these effects, we reformulate the substantive stan-
dards of copyright law and adjust the evidentiary doctrines that ac-
company those standards. Specifically, we divide the domain of ex-
pressive works into three categories. The first category consists of 
exceptionally original works. The second is comprised of a wide va-
riety of works that exhibit regular or average originality. The third 
accommodates works that are almost or completely unoriginal. 
Under our proposed system, exceptionally original works will 
entitle their authors to a sword and a shield. Authors of such works 
will both receive very broad protection against infringements and 
be sheltered from copyright liability. Works in the second category 
will not enjoy the privileged status of works that belong to the first 
category. The protection and liability of those works’ authors will 
depend on the relative originality of each work. In resolving con-
flicts between those works, courts will compare the level of origi-
nality of the plaintiff’s work with that of the defendant’s work. If 
the plaintiff’s work is more original than the defendant’s, the plain-
tiff will prevail. Upon winning this originality competition, the 
plaintiff will be able to collect damages but not injunctive relief. 
Finally, authors of the scantly original or altogether unoriginal 
works that fall into the third category will receive no protection at 
all. Those authors will also assume liability for imitating works of 
others. 
To operationalize our scheme, we introduce three legal mecha-
nisms: “the doctrine of inequivalents,” “the added-value doctrine,” 
and “the sameness rule.” Each of these mechanisms is designed to 
apply in one of our originality categories. Our first mechanism, the 
inequivalents doctrine, will apply to the category of exceptionally 
original works. The second, the added-value doctrine, will govern 
disputes between works of average originality. Finally, the same-
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ness rule will regulate conflicts involving minimally original or un-
original works. In the remainder of this Part, we explain in detail 
how courts should apply our proposed mechanisms. We also com-
pare our mechanisms to the rules that copyright law currently em-
ploys, and show that these mechanisms outperform extant copy-
right rules by any chosen criterion of efficiency and fairness. 
A. The Doctrine of Inequivalents 
The doctrine of inequivalents will exempt the defendant from 
copyright infringement liability when her work is exceptionally 
original and creative. The work’s exceptional creativity may be 
self-evident, so that a court can verify it without recourse to expert 
testimony. Alternatively, the work’s exceptional creativity could be 
established by reliance on the testimonies of experts from the rele-
vant industry. The experts will rely on the same knowledge they 
presently invoke in copyright trials when they testify about works’ 
similarity and success on the market.68
In either case, an alleged infringer who borrowed from a copy-
righted work and seeks to rely on the doctrine of inequivalents will 
have to establish her work’s exceptional creativity—or inequiva-
lence—by clear and convincing evidence. This evidentiary re-
quirement will minimize the number of court decisions that erro-
neously grant works an inequivalence status.69 As a result, only 
highly original and creative works will earn the safe harbor of “ex-
ceptional creativity.” Authors of those truly exceptional works will 
consequently be immunized against infringement suits by prior au-
thors from whose works they borrowed. 
68 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 952–
54 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (relying on expert testimony to find a market for 
non-infringing uses of peer-to-peer software and to quantify the volume of infringe-
ment); Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating 
that “[t]he extrinsic test [of works’ substantial similarity] often requires analytical dis-
section of a work and expert testimony.” (citing Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft 
Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442 (9th Cir. 1994))); Repp v. Webber, 132 F.3d 882, 887 (2d 
Cir. 1997) (relying on expert testimony in determining “harmonic similarities” be-
tween musical works); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s 
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977) (describing the use of expert testimony for 
the extrinsic test on substantial similarity); see also Sturdza v. U.A.E., 281 F.3d 1287, 
1300 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (observing that courts adjudicating copyright cases increasingly 
rely on experts). 
69 See Stein, supra note 62, at 152–53. 
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Accordingly, if Anna, a film producer, incorporated expressive 
elements from a short story by Bill in a path-breaking movie she 
produced, our doctrine of inequivalents will shelter her from liabil-
ity. The high level of originality and creativity in Anna’s work 
should grant her privileged status under our proposed scheme, 
even though she used protected elements from a preexisting work. 
The inequivalents doctrine may be justified on grounds of both 
efficiency and fairness. Works demonstrating exceptional creativity 
significantly enrich society’s literary, artistic, and aesthetic experi-
ences.70 Authors of exceptionally creative works therefore ought to 
be both encouraged to produce them and rewarded for doing so. 
Their creative efforts should not be stalled by the threat of copy-
right liability for non-imitative copying of other works. 
This justification may encounter an objection from general prop-
erty theory. Arguably, an expressive work that exhibits a scintilla 
of creativity71 should belong to its author in the same categorical 
way in which tangible assets belong to their owners. An asset 
owner should be able to fend off unauthorized users by means of 
self-help and by recourse to the legal system. She should also be 
able to set a price for allowing other people to acquire or use her 
asset. This regime is fair in that it protects the fruits of people’s 
productive labor against encroachments and free-riding.72 This re-
gime is also efficient in that it gives people a selfish reason for de-
veloping and protecting assets that improve society’s well-being.73 
Arguably, these well-known justifications of ownership extend to 
all assets that can be owned, rather than to tangible property alone. 
70 See Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. Davis L. 
Rev. 1151, 1151 (2007) (“Creativity is universally agreed to be a good that copyright 
law should seek to promote.”). 
71 See, e.g., Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d 107, 118 (D.D.C. 
2004), aff’d sub nom. Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262 (D.C. Cir. 
2005) (describing originality as requiring independent creation and “just a scintilla of 
creativity”). 
72 See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 Tex. L. 
Rev. 1031, 1031–33 (2005) (discussing prevention of free-riding in intellectual prop-
erty).
73 See, e.g., Robert M. Hurt & Robert M. Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of 
Copyright, 56 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 421, 425 (1966) (explicating the pre-
diction that “[t]he general welfare will . . . be enhanced by enacting copyright legisla-
tion which encourages the creation and publication of manuscripts that otherwise 
would not have come into existence”). 
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Expressive works, regardless of how original they are, are among 
those assets.74 If so, authors of those works should be able to enjoin 
others from unauthorized copying; at the very least, those who 
copy an owned work should pay its author a market-price fee or 
other equitable amount.75
We believe that this objection is overstated. An author who bor-
rows from another’s work to create an exceptionally creative work 
of her own does not appropriate the copied work in the traditional 
property sense. Far from imitating or reproducing this work, the 
author creates a novel and highly creative expressive work that in-
tegrates predominantly her original ideas. The closest property 
analogue of the author’s action, therefore, is accession of assets,76 
as opposed to misappropriation of another’s property. The acces-
sion in our context is special in that it does not destroy the copied 
work, as in the case of accession of tangible inputs. Nor does ex-
pressive accession necessarily dilute the income-generating oppor-
tunities of the copied work’s owner. The owner can still sell his 
work or allow others to use it for a fee in exactly the same way in 
which he could do so before the accession. Furthermore, the link-
age between the first work and the new creation increases the cop-
ied work’s visibility and promotes its sales. 
Highly creative works are likely to enhance the value of the pre-
existing works from which they borrow. This fact distinguishes our 
case from cases in which an unauthorized user uses the owner’s as-
set to create a new asset. When tangible assets are used in the 
process of creating new ones, the original assets are often de-
stroyed or transformed, and, in any event, the owner stands to lose 
from the unauthorized use. Hence, the law seeks to reinstate the 
74 See Hughes, supra note 61, at 291. For a recent philosophical defense of this 
claim, see Jonathan Peterson, Lockean Property and Literary Works, 14 Legal The-
ory 257 (2008).  
75 See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of 
Intellectual Property, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1455, 1467 (2002) (“By creating and enforcing 
exclusive rights in intellectual goods, copyrights . . . not only stifle unauthorized copy-
ing, but also enable authors and inventors to charge for the use of their works.”). 
76 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Property: Principles and Policies 165–
75 (2007) (stating and explaining the principle of accession in property law); Thomas 
W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership (May 2009) (unpublished manuscript, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1400902) (providing a 
comprehensive analysis of accession principles and their economic and moral justifi-
cations). 
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aggrieved owner’s wealth.77 This is not the case in the context of in-
tangible goods. When the subsequent work falls into the category 
of inequivalence, the original author suffers no real harm, and his 
plea for remediation is unfounded.78
It is noteworthy that patent law has long recognized an excep-
tion similar to the one we seek to introduce into copyright law.79 
Patent law’s doctrine of reverse equivalents limits the protection 
granted to first-in-time patentees against genuine technological in-
novators whose inventions accomplish the same result described in 
a prior patent, but in a wholly different way.80 As the Supreme 
Court explained: 
[W]here a device is so far changed in principle from a patented 
article that it performs the same or a similar function in a sub-
stantially different way, but nevertheless falls within the literal 
words of the claim, the doctrine of equivalents may be used [in 
reverse] to restrict the claim and defeat the patentee’s action for 
infringement.81
This doctrine of reverse equivalents in patent law is a conceptual 
twin of our inequivalence doctrine. Although there are important 
differences in the design and substance of the two doctrines,82 both 
serve to bar liability in certain cases of literal infringement. 
77 Merrill & Smith, supra note 76, at 171; see also Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Prop-
erty as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 Yale L.J. 1742, 1766 
(2007) (“The law of accession deals with situations in which one person mixes her la-
bor or other inputs with someone else’s property. Generally, innocent improvers can 
purchase the owner’s interest in the improved property . . . , but if the owner’s prop-
erty is more valuable than the improvement, the improver can demand payment for 
the added value but cannot keep the improved property.”). 
78 Professor Henry Smith, supra note 77, at 1766–73, was first to analogize the acqui-
sition of intellectual property rights to the rules of accession. Under his theory, intel-
lectual property rights remunerate innovators who produce value by mixing their in-
tellectual labor and other inputs with the information situated in the public domain. 
79 See, e.g., Robert L. Harmon, Patents and the Federal Circuit 417 (8th ed. 2007). 
80 For discussions of the doctrine of reverse equivalents in modern patent law, see 
5B Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 18.04[4], at 18-827 to -51 (2007); Charles 
F. Pigott, Jr., Equivalents in Reverse, 48 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 291 (1966).  
81 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608–09 (1950). 
82 See Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 719, 
731–49 (2009) (distinguishing between the peripheral protection of patents and the 
exemplar-focused protection of copyright). 
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Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.83 vividly illustrates how 
our inequivalents doctrine can be operationalized. This cause cé-
lèbre featured Alice Randall, a young African-American novelist, 
whose book The Wind Done Gone84 retold the story of Gone with 
the Wind85 from the vantage point of the black characters. Randall’s 
goal was to offer a very different portrayal of the South than that 
offered in Margaret Mitchell’s classic. To achieve this goal, Randall 
had to draw to some extent on Mitchell’s book. And she did.86 It 
was undisputed that Randall referred to Gone with the Wind in the 
foreword of her book;87 she mentioned key characters from 
Mitchell’s book, albeit by different names;88 and she also borrowed 
from their central relationships and scenes.89 It was also alleged 
that Randall copied some dialogue from Gone with the Wind.90 This 
allegation was disputed by Randall. 
The trustee of Mitchell’s estate filed a copyright infringement 
suit against Randall and her publisher, seeking injunctive relief 
against both. The district court granted the plaintiff’s motion for a 
preliminary injunction and enjoined Randall and her publisher 
from distributing, offering, or even displaying the new book.91 The 
Eleventh Circuit vacated the judgment of the District Court92 and 
remanded for a finding on whether Randall’s book should be con-
sidered a parody of “Gone with the Wind.”93 Despite Randall’s ex-
tensive copying from Mitchell’s classic that normally amounts to an 
infringement of copyright, the court acknowledged that a fair use 
defense was available, and that, given its likelihood of success, the 
injunction should be vacated.94
We agree with the outcome of the case, but not with the court’s 
reasoning. We contend that, as a normative matter, the case should 
have come under our doctrine of inequivalents. The court’s catego-
83  268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
84 Alice Randall, The Wind Done Gone (2001).  
85 Margaret Mitchell, Gone With the Wind (Macmillan 1936).  





91 Id. at 1259. 
92 Id. at 1277. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
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rization of Randall’s book as a “parody” was deeply problematic.95 
This book is certainly not a parody in the conventional sense of the 
term.96 Randall used Mitchell’s romanticized portrayal of the white 
antebellum South as a background for her antithetical account of 
the black slaves’ experience.97 Therefore, the court’s categorization 
of The Wind Done Gone as a parody may have done injustice to 
Randall’s literary achievement and hurt its sales. Yet, under extant 
doctrine, the Eleventh Circuit did not have much of a choice. 
We posit that our inequivalents doctrine provides a much more 
promising venue for dealing with such works as The Wind Done 
Gone. Under our framework, Randall’s book would not have been 
infringing at all, and hence there would be no need for a strained 
fair use analysis to salvage the work. Even though Randall invaria-
bly had to borrow certain elements from Mitchell’s book, her book 
is brimming with originality. Indeed, Randall’s book possessed 
such a high level of originality as to immunize it from an infringe-
ment suit from Mitchell’s estate. Randall’s creative effort produced 
a book qualitatively different from Gone with the Wind. Randall 
did not attempt to imitate the classic. Instead, she attempted—
successfully—to break new literary ground. The plaintiff’s por-
trayal of Randall’s book as an unauthorized sequel of Gone with 
the Wind therefore seems specious. The two books are inequiva-
95 The court below thoroughly examined Randall’s novel and concluded that its 
overall purpose was not to parody Gone With the Wind, but rather “to create a sequel 
to the older work and provide Ms. Randall’s social commentary on the antebellum 
South. . . . [that] retells the earlier story in a condensed version from a different per-
spective. . . .” Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1378 
(N.D. Ga. 2001). 
96 See, e.g., Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 902 (11th ed. 2003) (defining 
“parody” as “a literary or musical work in which the style of an author or work is 
closely imitated for comic effect or in ridicule”); The Oxford Reference Dictionary 
611 (Joyce M. Hawkins ed., 1986) (defining “parody” as “a humorous exaggerated 
imitation of an author, literary work, style, etc.” and as “a grotesque imitation, a trav-
esty”).  
97 See Siva Vaidhyanathan, The Anarchist in the Library: How the Clash Between 
Freedom and Control is Hacking the Real World and Crashing the System 84 (2004) 
(explaining that “The Wind Done Gone is not a parody of Gone with the Wind. It is a 
revision, a retelling of the classic from a critical stance in a vernacular voice. It’s also a 
supplement, another perspective in the parallax view of race and history that the 
United States desperately needs” and concluding that “[i]nstead of cheating by 
stretching the definition of parody . . . the appeals court should have considered the 
big questions: Does American copyright law protect works . . . in too many ways, and 
with too many ancillary powers for the general good?”). 
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lents. There is no reasonable way to perceive them differently. 
Classifying Randall’s book as a non-infringing inequivalent would 
have spared her the embarrassment of being labeled an infringer 
that escaped liability by proving a defense. Likewise, it would have 
saved Randall’s publisher the need to market her highly creative 
novel as a parody. 
Another case that fits under our inequivalents doctrine involves 
the “epic” legal battle between Superman and “The Greatest 
American Hero.”98 The owners of the copyright in Superman, the 
famous fictional hero of films and books, brought copyright in-
fringement allegations against the developers and broadcasters of a 
television series featuring Ralph Hinkley as The Greatest Ameri-
can Hero.99 Both characters had superhuman powers, which they 
used to defend the world against evil forces.100 They also closely re-
sembled each other in their appearance, actions, and phrases.101 
Hinkley’s personality and mental makeup, however, profoundly 
differed from Superman’s.102 Superman was a fearless and proud 
hero, who “performs his superhuman feats with skill, verve, and 
dash . . . [as] the master of his own destiny.”103 Hinkley, in contrast, 
acted “like a timid, reluctant hero, who accepts his missions grudg-
ingly[,] prefers to get on with his normal life, . . . is perplexed by 
the superhuman powers his costume confers and uses them in a 
bumbling, comical fashion.”104
Based on these facts, the Second Circuit agreed with the trial 
court’s finding that the two characters are not substantially similar 
to each other105 and affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ suit.106 
The court of appeals also mentioned “[t]he ‘parody’ branch of the 
‘fair use’ doctrine” that serves as “a means of fostering the creativ-
ity protected by the copyright law” 107 and “balances the public in-
terest in the free flow of ideas with the copyright holder’s interest 
98 Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983). 
99 Id. at 238. 
100 Id. at 236–37. 
101 Id. at 237. 
102 Id. at 243. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 245. 
106 Id. at 235. 
107 Id. at 242. 
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in the exclusive use of his work.”108 This reference, however, was 
merely parenthetical, since the court ultimately decided to align its 
decision with the trial judge’s findings and reasoning.109
We contend that our inequivalents doctrine justifies the outcome 
of the case more convincingly than the reasons chosen by the trial 
and appellate courts. The courts’ similarity analysis is deficient for 
a simple reason. Hinkley and Superman did not merely have simi-
lar superhuman powers, outfit, vocabulary, and achievements. 
Viewers’ understanding of the two faces of Hinkley crucially de-
pended on their familiarity with Superman. Hinkley was designed 
as a hero-antihero whose personality sharply contrasted with the 
unbendingly heroic personality of Superman. To establish this con-
trast, Hinkley’s creators had to imitate Superman’s features as 
closely as possible, and they did so successfully. This imitation also 
does not fit the category of “parody” because The Greatest Ameri-
can Hero attempted to achieve more than that and, arguably, suc-
ceeded. The authors of this work created a new fictional character 
that broke new ground in the genre of heroic comics.110 This charac-
ter was categorically different from his “only hero” predecessors, 
and uniformly defeated Superman in one-sided copyright battles.111 
The Greatest American Hero was an exceptionally creative work 
that copyright law should encourage rather than block. This simple 
fact prompted the courts to find a doctrine that would keep Hero 
alive. Our normative analysis is not constrained by positive law. 
We therefore propose to give exceptionally creative works—the 
true inequivalents—an explicit exemption from liability for copy-
ing. Creators of these exceptional works benefit society strongly 
enough to deserve this exemption. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 243–45. 
110 The Greatest American Hero became a cult-TV classic after building a distinct 
fanbase around the world. See, e.g., Jill Kipnis, Home Video Studios Seek Titles With 
Niche Allure, Billboard, Apr. 2, 2005, at 31, available at http://www.imdb.com/news/ 
ni0751803/ (noting that “[r]ecent cult releases from Anchor Bay [Entertainment] in-
clude ‘The Greatest American Hero—Season One’”).
111 See American Broadcasting Cos., 720 F.2d. at 235. 
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B. The Added-Value Doctrine 
The second doctrine we propose may be termed the “added-
value doctrine.” We designed it to identify the desirable scope of 
protection for authors of derivative works whose development in-
volved copying from preexisting material and who do not qualify 
for the safe harbor of the inequivalence doctrine.112 As a general 
matter, authors are entitled to copyright protection only in their 
original contributions; the protection does not extend to “the pre-
existing material employed in the work.”113 An author’s original 
contribution receives full copyright protection even when it is very 
modest.114 All authors, from highly original to virtually unoriginal, 
have the power to enjoin others from copying their works and re-
cover compensation for such copying.115
Apart from being costly to administer, these rules distort the 
creators’ incentive to compete with each other for the market seg-
ment that values high originality. Under our added-value doctrine, 
a copyright owner should only be able to enjoin works that are less 
original than her own. Her work’s property-rule protection will not 
exceed this limit. To secure injunctive relief against a putative in-
fringer, the author will thus need to show that her work contains a 
higher degree of originality relative to prior works than the in-
fringer’s work relative to hers. Authors of works as original as 
112 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining “derivative work” as “a work based upon 
one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatiza-
tion, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, 
abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, trans-
formed, or adapted”); Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(attesting that the definition of “derivative work” in 17 U.S.C. § 101 is “hopelessly 
overbroad” because all works borrow something from prior art, and noting that only 
substantial incorporation of preexisting materials will make a work “derivative” (cit-
ing Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984))); Gates Rubber Co. v. 
Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 839 (10th Cir. 1993) (explaining that a court decision 
on whether an incorporation of preexisting material was substantial enough to make 
the work derivative requires “a qualitative rather than a purely quantitative analysis” 
(citing Whelan Assocs., v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1245 (3d Cir. 
1986))). 
113 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2006); see also CMM Cable Rep, Inc. v. Ocean Coast Props., 
Inc., 97 F.3d 1504, 1515 (1st Cir. 1996) (observing that when an infringement allega-
tion comprises a complaint about an “expression that is not proprietary to plaintiff, 
then an essential ingredient is lacking from plaintiff’s prima facie case”). 
114 See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text. 
115 Id. 
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those they copy from, and—a fortiori—authors whose works are 
more original than those they copy from, will not be enjoined by 
copyright law. Instead, the author whose work was copied will re-
ceive liability-rule protection and collect compensation measured 
by the market value of the lifted expression.116 The goal of our de-
sign is to ensure, on the one hand, that authors receive compensa-
tion commensurate with the market value of their original contri-
butions, and, on the other hand, that works containing greater 
originality and creativity than the plaintiff’s protected work are not 
expelled from the market. 
Under this design, the defendant will carry the burden of prov-
ing her work’s equal or higher originality. The plaintiff will then 
have to prove to the court the market value of the defendant’s use 
of his work. Both burdens will be satisfied by a preponderance of 
the evidence. Courts will apply these rules by relying on expert tes-
timony and by making their own comparisons between works. This 
task will be easier to perform than the controversial dissection ana-
lysis117 by which courts presently determine the copyright protec-
tion of works that combine both original and unoriginal elements.118
The added-value doctrine will promote creativity in two ways. 
First, it will stimulate competition for originality among all authors. 
Second, and equally important, the doctrine will afford greater 
freedom to more creative authors of derivative works and lesser 
freedom to authors whose derivative works are only modestly 
original. The combined effect of those incentives and protections is 
an environment that induces authors to optimize their creative ef-
116 In determining the appropriate compensation amounts, courts can rely on expert 
witnesses and market data. 
117 See 4 Nimmer on Copyright, § 13.03[A] at 1–34 (2008) (discussing difficulties of 
the dissection analysis and other methods courts use in determining works’ similarity); 
see also Sarah Brashears-Macatee, Total Concept and Feel or Dissection?: Ap-
proaches to the Misappropriation Test of Substantial Similarity, 68 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 
913 (1993) (discussing courts’ applications of the dissection analysis).  
118 For authoritative formulation and application of the dissection analysis, see Ap-
ple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442–47 (9th Cir. 1994). For other 
cases in which courts relied on the dissection method, see Concrete Mach. Co. v. Clas-
sic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 608–10 (1st Cir. 1988); Mattel, Inc. v. Azrak-
Hamway Int’l, Inc., 724 F.2d 357, 360 (2d Cir. 1983); Eden Toys, Inc. v. Marshall Field 
& Co., 675 F.2d 498, 500 (2d Cir. 1982); Conan Properties, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 712 F. 
Supp. 353, 358–59 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Farmers Independent Telephone Co. v. Thorman, 
648 F. Supp. 457, 460–61 (W.D. Wis. 1986). 
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forts—an incentive that will likely increase the development of 
original and creative works. 
The doctrine’s allocation of the burden of proof conforms to the 
general principles of evidence law.119 These principles require a 
plaintiff to establish his cause of action by a preponderance of the 
evidence, while placing a similar burden on the defendant who re-
lies on an affirmative defense.120 Our inequivalents doctrine places 
a heavier burden on the alleged infringer: she can establish her 
work’s exceptional creativity and inequivalence only by clear and 
convincing evidence.121 As we explained, this proof burden will sep-
arate works that are unequivocally exceptional in their originality 
from those that are not.122 Because authors of such exceptional 
works will get a full exemption from copyright liability, court deci-
sions that erroneously grant this exemption to an author will cause 
serious harm: annihilation of a well-earned copyright to the benefit 
of an opportunistic free-rider and the ex ante distortion of the in-
centive to create original works. The law consequently needs to 
impose on alleged infringers a stringent proof requirement that will 
minimize the incidence of those erroneous deprivations. The 
added-value doctrine need not incorporate such a requirement be-
cause it does not give defendants a complete exemption from copy-
right liability. Under this doctrine, a defendant who copies an-
other’s work to create an equally or more original work of her own 
will not go scot-free. Any such defendant will have to pay the cop-
ied work’s owner a market-priced fee. 
We illustrate our added-value doctrine through the case of Bate-
man v. Mnemonics, Inc.,123 which involved a technologically com-
plex and fundamentally important dispute. There, the court was 
asked to address compatibility-driven copying of computer soft-
ware as an issue of first impression.124 A company operating park-
ing garages needed computer software for its operations. It re-
tained two engineers, who worked on the software development as 
independent contractors. The engineers failed to develop a pro-
119 Stein, supra note 62, at 219–25. 
120 Id. 
121 See supra Section III.A. 
122 Id. 
123 79 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996). 
124 Id. at 1536–37. 
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gram with which the company felt comfortable, and the parties dis-
solved their engagement.125 The company subsequently used parts 
of the engineers’ copyrighted software to develop a program with 
which it could work.126 The engineers sued the company, claiming 
that this use infringed their copyright.127 The company’s defense re-
lied on the “compatibility exception”—a proposition that copying 
from another’s software does not violate copyright to the extent it 
was dictated by interface-compatibility requirements.128
This proposition holds that certain components of a computer 
program—namely, the interface components—set up communica-
tion between the hardware, the operating system, and specific-
application programs. To secure unimpeded communication 
throughout the system, these components must be mutually com-
patible.129 Ideally, they must also be standard in order to minimize 
learning costs for computer users.130 Making compatibility-driven 
copying actionable in copyright would give interface developers a 
colossal monopolistic power, while depriving the users—and soci-
ety at large—of crucial network benefits.131 Based on this theory, 
the company argued that its use of the engineers’ software was 
compatibility-driven and did not exceed the dictates of compatibil-
ity.132 Furthermore, it urged the court to filter out portions of the 
engineers’ software that were dictated by the interface with its ga-
rage-management program.133 The company requested the trial 
judge to instruct the jury about the compatibility exception, but the 
judge denied that request.134 Subsequently, the jury decided the 
case in the engineers’ favor, and the company appealed.135
The appellate court granted the company’s appeal without fitting 
its decision into a specific doctrinal niche. It held that, although in-
125 Id. at 1538–39. 
126 Id. at 1539–40. 
127 Id. at 1540. 
128 Id. at 1546. 
129 See Timothy S. Teter, Note, Merger and the Machines: An Analysis of the Pro-
Compatibility Trend in Computer Software Copyright Cases, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1061, 
1063–65 (1993). 
130 Id. at 1065. 
131 Id. at 1067. 
132 Bateman, 79 F.3d at 1537, 1546. 
133 Id. at 1540. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 1536. 
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terface specifications are copyrightable in principle, compatibility 
demands “may work to deny copyright protection to certain por-
tions of a computer program.”136 As far as doctrine is concerned, 
the court ruled that “[w]hether the protection is unavailable be-
cause these factors render the expression unoriginal, nonexpressive 
per [Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act], or whether these factors 
compel a finding of fair use, copyright estoppel, or misuse, the re-
sult is to deny copyright protection to portions of the computer 
program.”137
This decision obviously fails to deliver a criterion by which to 
distinguish between interface specifications that are copyrightable 
and those that are not. Among the academic formulations of the 
required criterion, two stand out as attractive.138 Both formulations 
rely on the idea/expression merger doctrine.139 The two formula-
tions, however, set different conditions for removing the copyright 
protection from interface software and for allowing compatibility-
driven copying of interface specifications. Under one of those for-
mulations, interface specifications necessary for achieving com-
patibility should be categorized as unprotected “ideas,” as opposed 
to protected “expressions.”140 Under another, more restrictive for-
mulation, an interface element would be classified as an “idea” af-
ter actually attaining a de facto industry standard status.141 Each of 
those proposals acknowledges its dependency on a legal doctrine 
136 Id. at 1547. 
137 Id. 
138 See Teter, supra note 129, at 1067–68 (“Two frequently raised innovation argu-
ments militate against allowing copying to achieve compatibility, but both are incon-
clusive at best. The ‘incentive’ innovation argument maintains that if interface soft-
ware can be copied to the extent necessary to achieve compatibility, developers will 
not bother to create new interfaces . . . . The second innovation concern, the 
‘QWERTY argument,’ notes that due to the user’s costs of abandoning an old stan-
dard, standardization both constrains design and stifles innovation.”); see also Peter S. 
Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 1329, 
1340–41 (1987) (balancing costs and benefits in designing legal protection for intellec-
tual work). 
139 See Teter, supra note 129, at 1072 (relating compatibility and the merger doc-
trine). 
140 Id. 
141 See Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Appli-
cation Programs, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1045, 1101 (1989). 
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that is notoriously difficult to apply, but claims to be an optimal so-
lution of a difficult problem.142
The added-value doctrine resolves this problem in a simple and 
intuitive fashion without invoking the fuzzy distinction between 
“ideas” and “expressions.” The doctrine will require the court to 
determine whether the allegedly infringing computer program is 
original. If it is, the programmer’s copying of interface specifica-
tions from another program will be permitted, subject to compen-
sation. The defendant’s creative endeavor will not be suppressed 
by the interface developer, but she would have to pay the plaintiff 
the market price of the copied interface software. If this software is 
not generally accessible, the developer would be entitled to com-
pensation that the court would determine with the help of experts. 
In cases in which the copied part is publicly available code, either 
because it is a non-protected standard or open-source code, the 
compensation amount will be zero. This straightforward liability-
rule solution would allow developers of computer programs to in-
ternalize the benefits they produce without blocking each others’ 
innovative efforts.143
Our second illustration of the added-value doctrine is Acuff-
Rose v. Jostens.144 This case featured a plaintiff whose work was not 
original enough to receive full copyright protection that includes 
injunctive relief, but was sufficiently creative to qualify for the li-
ability-rule protection under our added-value doctrine. The court, 
however, dismissed the plaintiff’s entire suit. As we will now ex-
plain, this outcome resulted from the court’s interpretation of ex-
isting copyright doctrines that divert courts’ attention from the 
straightforward added-value analysis. 
142 See id. at 1103; Teter, supra note 129, at 1066–72 . 
143 Note that our proposal does not chill creative inventors of path-breaking inter-
face programs. Any such program can be patented. The Bateman court acknowledged 
it by observing that “[i]t is particularly important to exclude methods of operation and 
processes from the scope of copyright in computer programs because much of the 
contents of computer programs is patentable. Were we to permit an author to claim 
copyright protection for those elements of the work that should be the province of 
patent law, we would be undermining the competitive principles that are fundamental 
to the patent system.” Bateman, 79 F.3d at 1541 n.21; see also Menell, supra note 141, 
at 1103; cf. Miller, supra note 9 (proposing to model copyright protection on a stan-
dard akin to the non-obviousness requirement of patent law). 
144 155 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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The defendant promoted sales of class rings by using the slogan 
“U Got 2 Stand 4 Something.”145 This slogan portrayed the ring as a 
symbol of its wearer’s social identity and affiliation to his or her 
school.146 The slogan was identical to the name of Aaron Tippin’s 
famous cowboy lyric “You’ve Got to Stand for Something” that 
repeatedly uses the expression, “You’ve got to stand for something 
or you’ll fall for anything.”147 The song’s copyright owner sued the 
defendant for copyright infringement. The defendant denied 
wrongdoing, claiming that the phrase “You’ve got to stand for 
something” is an unprotected cliché that belongs to the public do-
main.148 As an alternative, the defendant raised the “fair use” de-
fense.149
The defendant’s denial of copying was untrustworthy. The crea-
tion and approval of its advertising campaign coincided with the 
song’s peaking popularity.150 The campaign’s advertisement almost 
expressly acknowledged copying from the song by stating that 
“The song says it best: If you don’t stand for something, you’ll fall 
for anything.”151 The identity between the defendant’s campaign 
slogan and Tippin’s famous line therefore could not be accidental. 
Unsurprisingly, the court determined that the defendant copied the 
slogan from the song.152 This determination, however, did not avail 
the plaintiff because the court accepted the defendant’s second 
claim and held that the contested phrase is, indeed, a cliché.153 This 
holding relied on numerous documented uses of the phrase “If you 
145 Acuff-Rose Music v. Jostens Inc., 988 F. Supp. 289, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
146 The defendant’s sales brochures, fliers, and posters read: 
The song says it best: If you don’t stand for something, you’ll fall for anything. 
And one of the best ways to show you stand for something is by wearing a Jos-
tens Class Ring. The ring stands for your school. It stands for the people you 
know. It stands for the greatest class of all time (yours, of course). And it stands 
for the things you do to make your class the greatest. Most of all, it stands for 
you. The gold, the stone, the inscriptions, they add up to nothing less than a 
small piece of your personal history. The ring stands for who you are—and 
that’s something worth standing for. 
Id.  
147 Acuff-Rose, 155 F.3d at 141. 
148 Acuff-Rose, 988 F. Supp. at 290. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 293. 
151 Id. at 291 (emphasis added). 
152 Id. at 293. 
153 Id. at 295. 
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don’t stand for something, you will fall for anything” in sermons, 
political speeches, and newspaper articles that bore no connection 
to Tippin’s song.154
We believe that this decision is flawed. The decision failed to 
address the significance of the defendant’s copying from Tippin’s 
song. The defendant’s campaign used the phrase “You’ve got to 
stand for something or you’ll fall for anything” as appearing in that 
song. The defendant did not use this phrase as a cliché, nor did it 
refer to similar phrases that appeared in sermons, political 
speeches, or elsewhere in the public domain. Most crucially, the de-
fendant’s advertisement of the ring alluded specifically to the 
song’s line “You’ve got to stand for something or you’ll fall for 
anything.”155 The defendant designated this line to be the focus of 
its prospective buyers’ attention. This designation constituted an 
almost explicit acknowledgment of the song’s creativity and 
prominence. The defendant therefore could not even deny that the 
song’s line exhibited a “scintilla”156 or “modicum”157 of creativity—
the originality level that the law deems sufficient for establishing 
copyright protection.158 Nor could the defendant deny the fact that 
it traded on the public approbation of Tippin’s efforts.159
The court’s ruling against the plaintiff also relied on the fact that 
Tippin’s lyric represented “a moral lesson in the form of a father’s 
advice to his son to live a principled life,”160 while the defendant’s 
campaign extolled the virtue of wearing the advertised ring as a 
symbol of social status and achievement.161 Based on this fact, the 
court concluded that “the ‘total concept and feel’ of the two works 
differ dramatically.”162 This inference, however, resulted from the 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 291. 
156 Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d 107, 118 (D.D.C. 2004). 
157 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–46 (1991); see also 1 
Nimmer, supra note 117, § 2.01[A] & [B]. 
158 1 Nimmer, supra note 117, § 2.01[A] & [B]. 
159 See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2nd Cir. 1946) (Frank, J.) (rationalizing 
a musician’s copyright entitlement as protecting “his interest in the potential financial 
returns from his compositions which derive from the lay public’s approbation of his 
efforts”). 
160 Acuff-Rose, 988 F. Supp. at 296. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. (quoting Kretschmer v. Warner Bros., 1994 WL 259814, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 
8, 1994)). 
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court’s failure to consider the works’ common theme: approbation 
of people who “belong to something” by virtue of having ironclad 
commitments and affiliations. 
The defendant undoubtedly expanded the meaning of Tippin’s 
phrase in an original way. This expansion, however, was not excep-
tionally creative and thus did not turn the defendant’s use of the 
phrase into an inequivalent. Notice that the defendant’s campaign 
did not contribute to the popularity of Tippin’s song. On the con-
trary, it attempted to profit from the song’s popularity. Our theory 
therefore calls for the application of the added-value doctrine. This 
doctrine would have afforded the song’s owner a liability-rule pro-
tection, forcing the defendant to compensate the owner for the un-
authorized use of the song. As for the compensation amount, 
courts should be able to determine it by relying on experts and 
common sense. Courts will not make such determinations easily. 
This difficulty, however, is not insurmountable and it hardly pro-
vides a good reason for turning copyrighted works into a fair game 
for opportunists. 
The added-value doctrine has a socially desirable implication for 
cases involving plaintiffs whose works’ originality is only slight. We 
exemplify this implication by a battle of T-shirts found in Matthews 
v. Freedman.163 A souvenir children’s T-shirt that the plaintiff de-
signed and marketed featured a slogan, “Someone Went to Boston 
and got me this shirt because they love me Very much.” This slo-
gan was surrounded by small drawings of a fish, a sailboat, a lob-
ster, Faneuil Hall, and scattered hearts. A souvenir children’s T-
shirt designed and marketed by the defendant told the world 
“Someone Who Loves Me Went to Boston and Got Me this Shirt.” 
This slogan was surrounded by small drawings of a fish, a sailboat, 
a lobster, a swan boat, ducklings, and a smiling sun. The two de-
signers confronted each other at the Boston Gift Show and subse-
quently in court.164
Both the trial court and the First Circuit found no infringement 
of copyright in the defendant’s T-shirt.165 The two T-shirts were 
strikingly similar to each other. The defendant, in all likelihood, 
163 157 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 1998). 
164 Id. at 26. 
165 Id. at 27–28. 
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copied the plaintiff’s T-shirt design. Both T-shirts, however, exhib-
ited a trivial compilation of ideas, expressions, and images easily 
extractable from the public domain.166 Because of this lack of origi-
nality, the courts held that the plaintiff’s T-shirt deserves only weak 
protection against complete literal copying.167 The defendant’s T-
shirt was not completely identical to the plaintiff’s. The defendant 
consequently won the suit.168
The courts’ decision to scale the plaintiff’s protection down and 
unlock the added value of the competitor’s product perfectly aligns 
with our proposal. Our added-value doctrine would yield exactly 
the same result. Given the plaintiff’s almost invisible addition to 
prior art, any difference between her and the defendant’s T-shirt 
design would allow the defendant to win the originality contest or, 
alternatively, establish that his design of the T-shirt was as original 
as hers. As far as compensation is concerned, the plaintiff’s eligibil-
ity for that remedy will depend on the market value of the expres-
sion that the defendant borrowed from her work. The plaintiff 
would obviously fail to prove that her addition to phrases and im-
ages extractable for free from the public domain had any value on 
the market. Adjudicators applying the added-value doctrine would 
consequently have to dismiss her suit.169
C. THE SAMENESS RULE 
Our third doctrinal proposal, the “sameness rule,” is different 
from the first two doctrines we advanced. It is designed to penalize 
copiers and imitators whose works are plainly unoriginal. It also 
bears emphasis that our sameness rule resembles the copyright in-
fringement analysis adopted by the Seventh Circuit, although we 
believe that our design improves upon that circuit’s approach. The 
primary purpose of this rule is to deter creators from copying prior 
works and incentivize them to ensure that their works contain at 




169 The outcome of that suit would be different if the plaintiff could establish literal 
copying of her design by the defendant. The court would then enjoin the defendant. 
The plaintiff, however, would still have difficulties in proving her compensable dam-
age. 
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strengthen the copyright protection of original creators, whose 
works—after becoming successful—entice copying and imitation. 
An author who copies a prior work of another person does not 
merely fail the test for originality. By and large, he also acknowl-
edges that the copied work is original and valuable. 
The sameness rule achieves its desiderata by setting up a strong 
presumption of copyright infringement in cases featuring striking 
similarity between the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s works. To 
benefit from this rule, the plaintiff will have to establish that her 
and the defendant’s works are identical, or at least strikingly simi-
lar to each other, and bear no similarity to a work or object in the 
public domain. The plaintiff will also have to prove that she cre-
ated her work before the defendant created hers. Based on these 
facts, the court will deem the plaintiff’s work original and deserving 
of protection against reproduction and imitation by others. The de-
fendant will then be able to rebut this presumption by adducing 
clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff’s work itself is in-
eligible for copyright protection or that she created her own work 
independently. If the defendant fails to establish one of those de-
fenses, the court would hold her responsible for infringing the 
plaintiff’s copyright. The clear and convincing evidence require-
ment will thus solidify the protection of authors of original works 
and deter free-riders. 
The inequivalents doctrine and the sameness rule both aim at ca-
librating a defendant’s liability to the degree of originality in her 
work. Yet, the two doctrines operate at the opposite extremes of 
the originality spectrum. The inequivalents doctrine operates at the 
high end of the originality spectrum, where it attempts to grant 
immunity to defendants whose works contain significant original-
ity. The sameness rule, by contrast, operates at the low end of the 
originality spectrum, where it increases the potential liability of de-
fendants whose works possess little to no originality. 
The sameness rule thus induces originality by incentivizing the 
production of novel works that substantially differ from those that 
already exist. Creation of a highly original work will guarantee its 
author not only the highest degree of protection but also complete 
immunity against suit. Authors who wish to take advantage of the 
inequivalents doctrine may need to research preexisting expressive 
works and distinguish their works from them. The breadth of that 
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research will depend on its cost and the author’s expected benefit 
from the contemplated work. Creators of works that have high ex-
pected value consequently will have a strong incentive to intensify 
the preemption search. The search, admittedly, can never be per-
fect in light of the number of expressive works that already exist. 
Nevertheless, it can help authors in distinguishing their works from 
preexisting expressions. 
As we already mentioned, our sameness rule aims to preserve 
the independent creation defense recognized by extant copyright 
law, and it is designed to do so. That said, we need to post a caveat 
here. In the real world, there is a risk that courts will tend to infer 
infringement whenever there is striking similarity between two 
works. Based on an experience-driven presumption against coinci-
dences, courts may decide that such a high level of similarity is nev-
er accidental, and if so, they might sometimes trample upon the in-
dependent creation defense by erroneously identifying as 
infringement some cases of independent creation. We are also cog-
nizant of the fact that the clear and convincing evidence require-
ment that we impose on defendants will exacerbate this risk. This 
allocation of the risk of error will achieve the following effect: rela-
tive to the general rule that imposes the burden of proof on the 
plaintiff, the incidence of false negatives (decisions erroneously 
denying the claim of independent creation) will increase, while the 
incidence of false positives (decisions erroneously granting the 
claim) will decrease.170 Hence, the sameness rule enhances the pro-
tection of highly original authors at the price of exposing inde-
pendent creators of works that are similar to preexisting works to 
an increased risk of copyright liability.171 From an ex post perspec-
tive, this tradeoff is far from obvious. Yet, the proper way to exam-
ine its effects is to evaluate the ex ante incentives for independent 
creators. Those creators would have to preserve evidence demon-
170 Tradeoff between false positives and false negatives is what evidentiary rules 
generally do: see Stein, supra note 62, at 133–40. Formulation of evidentiary rules 
therefore should always reflect societal preferences in the allocation of the risk of er-
ror that vary from one category of cases to another. Id. at 118–33. 
171 It should be emphasized that the increase in risk is very small because even under 
current doctrines independent creation is very difficult to establish and defendants 
whose works are identical or strikingly similar to those of the plaintiffs fare very 
poorly in court. So, in practice, our amendment will worsen the lot of independent 
creators only marginally. 
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strating that they created their works independently. Because pre-
serving such self-regarding evidence is easy, creators that are truly 
independent would virtually always be able to prove their defense. 
These creators would easily separate their true claims from the 
false defenses of independent creation. 
The Seventh Circuit case of Ty v. GMA Accessories172 illustrates 
how the sameness rule will penalize unoriginal creators. This case 
was resolved by Chief Judge Posner’s decision that affirmed a pre-
liminary injunction enjoining the defendant from selling a toy simi-
lar to a bean-bag pig copyrighted and marketed by the plaintiff.173 
Chief Judge Posner began his analysis of the case by observing that 
the two pigs are “nearly identical.”174 Identity, of course, does not 
entail copying that the law proscribes: “if independent creation re-
sults in an identical work, the creator of that work is free to sell 
it.”175 Showing a striking similarity between the two works, how-
ever, can establish copying—and it can do so, according to Chief 
Judge Posner, even in the absence of an independent demonstra-
tion that the defendant had access to the plaintiff’s work.176 This 
showing, however, must be accompanied by evidence proving the 
protected work’s uniqueness. Specifically, the plaintiff must prove 
that he did not copy an object or a work that exists in the public 
domain from which the defendant could copy as well. As Chief 
Judge Posner explained, similarity between works replicating the 
same thing in the public domain “may be striking without being 
suspicious.”177
172 132 F.3d 1167 (7th Cir. 1997). 
173 Id. at 1169, 1173. 
174 Id. at 1169. 
175 Id. (citing Grubb v. KMS Patriots, L.P., 88 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996)); Selle v. Gibb, 
741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984). The court also explained the rule’s practical ration-
ale: 
[T]he creator of an expressive work—an author or sculptor or composer—
cannot canvass the entire universe of copyrighted works to discover whether his 
poem or song or, as in this case, “soft sculpture” is identical to some work in 
which copyright subsists, especially since unpublished, unregistered works are 
copyrightable. 
Id. 
176 As the court explains, “[the defendant] must produce evidence of access, all 
right—but, as we have just said . . . a similarity that is so close as to be highly unlikely 
to have been an accident of independent creation is evidence of access.” Id. at 1170. 
177 Id. The court illustrates this proposition by “two people photographing Niagara 
Falls from the same place at the same time of the day and year and in identical weath-
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Once the plaintiff proves that the defendant’s work is similar to 
his but not to anything else in the public domain, the burden of 
proof shifts to the defendant.178 The defendant must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that she created her work inde-
pendently rather than copied the plaintiff’s work.179 Chief Judge 
Posner held in this regard that the defendant’s evidence of inde-
pendent creation ought to be more detailed and, consequently, 
more persuasive than a generic claim that the work was independ-
ently created.180 This evidence must explain away the suspicion aris-
ing from the similarity between the defendant’s design and the 
plaintiff’s work.181 The defendant’s explanation also needs to spec-
ify the choices she made with regard to her design’s individual fea-
tures.182
The defendant in Ty failed to provide such evidence and conse-
quently was unable to defeat the plaintiff’s request for a prelimi-
nary injunction.183 The outcome in this case was due to the complete 
originality of the plaintiff’s toy and the complete unoriginality of 
the defendant’s product. As Chief Judge Posner explained, the 
plaintiff’s bean-bag pig had a fictional appearance that was original 
and unique.184 This appearance starkly differed from that of natural 
and lifelike toy pigs.185 The unique appearance of the plaintiff’s toy 
er.” Id.; see also First Am. Artificial Flowers, Inc. v. Joseph Markovits, Inc., 342 
F. Supp. 178, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (“[A] copyright on a work which bears practically a 
photographic likeness to the natural article, as here, is likely to prove a relatively 
weak copyright.”). 
178 Ty, 132 F.3d at 1171. 
179 Id. (holding that “[a]ccess (and copying) may be inferred when two works are so 
similar to each other and not to anything in the public domain that it is likely that the 
creator of the second work copied the first, but the inference can be rebutted by dis-
proving access or otherwise showing independent creation”). 
180 Id. at 1171–72. 
181 Id. 
182 In Chief Judge Posner’s words: 
Silence can be pregnant; the absence of any evidence of how the [defendant’s] 
designer’s drawing was translated into the Squealer-resembling production 
model, combined with the similarity of that model to Squealer (and to nothing in 
the public domain) . . . overbore the weak evidence of the [designer’s] affidavit. 
Id. 
183 Id. at 1173. 
184 Id. at 1170. 
185 As Chief Judge Posner put it, “[r]eal pigs are not the only pigs in the public do-
main. But GMA has not pointed to any fictional pig in the public domain that Preston 
resembles.” Id. 
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pig was a major contributor to its commercial success. The defen-
dant made an opportunistic attempt at sharing this success by de-
veloping a similarly looking toy. 
Under our sameness rule, the plaintiff in Ty would receive the 
highest degree of copyright protection for her original work. The 
plaintiff would be entitled to enjoin the unoriginal defendant from 
replicating her toy (and making profits from that replication). The 
rule’s application would thus make copyright protection coexten-
sive with the originality of the works in question. Chief Judge Pos-
ner’s decision in Ty squarely aligns with the sameness rule and 
promotes its goals.186
Application of the sameness rule will not always produce the 
same results as extant doctrine. We illustrate this point with an-
other Seventh Circuit opinion, Selle v. Gibb.187 This case featured a 
complaint by Ronald Selle, a composer, that the Bee Gees’ hit tune 
“How Deep Is Your Love” had infringed the copyright of his song 
“Let It End.”188 After trial, the jury decided that the alleged in-
fringement took place, but the judge granted Bee Gees’ motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.189 Selle appealed. 
The court affirmed the trial judge’s decision and ended the litiga-
tion that threatened the famous creators and performers of pop 
music with embarrassment and financial losses.190 The court’s dis-
missal of Selle’s appeal was based on the appraisal of the tunes’ 
186 A more recent decision of the Seventh Circuit, JCW Invs., Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., 
482 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2007), is equally illustrative. This case featured an infringement 
suit by one plush doll manufacturer against another that replicated its doll. The plain-
tiff’s doll, although peculiar, was highly original and created a niche market for itself. 
Id. at 912–13. Aware of the success of the plaintiff’s product, the defendant sought to 
compete with it by offering a similarly designed doll that replicated the total look and 
feel of the plaintiff’s doll. Id. The plaintiff sued the defendant for copyright infringe-
ment and obtained a summary judgment. The defendant appealed. Id. The Seventh 
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision. It acknowledged that the plaintiff’s doll 
evoked social stereotypes and humor that exist in the public domain, but held that the 
doll’s unique combination of features singles it out as an original expression of these 
phenomena that deserves copyright protection. Id. at 916. Most importantly, the Cir-
cuit used the originality of the plaintiff’s doll as a proxy for its determination that the 
defendant copied it. This ruling implicitly acknowledges that a work’s originality cor-
relates with the level of copyright protection it will receive. 
187 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984). 
188 Id. at 898. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
PARCHOMOVSKY&STEIN_BOOK 9/17/2009  5:37 PM 
1548 Virginia Law Review [Vol.  95:1505 
 
similarity.191 The court decided that this similarity was not striking 
enough. This decision overrode the opinion of the only expert who 
testified about the tunes’ similarity. This expert was a renowned 
professor of music from the Northwestern University, whose testi-
mony unequivocally supported Selle’s complaint of copyright in-
fringement.192 The expert compared the two songs’ musical notes 
and found that “the first eight bars of each song . . . have twenty-
four of thirty-four notes in plaintiff’s composition and twenty-four 
of forty notes in defendants’ composition which are identical in 
pitch and symmetrical position” and that “[o]f thirty-five rhythmic 
impulses in plaintiff’s composition and forty in defendants’, thirty 
are identical.”193 The expert also pointed to striking similarities be-
tween the notes and rhythmic impulses in the last four bars of the 
songs.194 Based on these similarities, the expert opined that the 
songs could not have been composed independently of one another 
and that he had never encountered two songs by different compos-
ers that are so similar to each other.195
Bee Gees did not call expert witnesses. Instead, its singer, song-
writer and producer, Barry Gibb, testified that “How Deep Is Your 
Love” was the group’s independent creation.196 The group’s man-
ager and two musicians corroborated this testimony.197 The work 
tape of “How Deep Is Your Love” indicated that its singers, the 
Gibb brothers, hummed and sang the tune to a keyboard player, 
who subsequently played it on his keyboard.198 Bee Gees’ witnesses 
authenticated this tape as a contemporaneous record of the song’s 
creation.199
Two facts were not in controversy. Selle’s song “Let It End” was 
created and copyrighted before the creation of “How Deep Is 
Your Love.”200 The public dissemination of “Let It End” was mini-
mal. Selle and his band played the song two or three times in the 
191 Id. at 901–06. 








200 Id. at 898. 
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Chicago area. Selle also sent the song to eleven music recording 
and publishing companies. These companies showed no interest in 
the song.201
The court based its decision to dismiss the appeal on a theory 
that attributed a miscalculation to Selle’s expert. According to that 
theory, the expert underestimated the probability of the tunes’ ac-
cidental sameness. This probability is much higher than estimated 
by the expert because the genre of pop music is simplistic by de-
sign. All pop songs are relatively short and build on repeated pat-
terns that are mostly not unique.202 Two independently composed 
melodies therefore may contain many accidental similarities. Al-
ternatively, similar melodies may originate from a common 
source.203 This genre-specific reality erodes the significance of 
“striking similarity” evidence. Factfinders cannot deduce from this 
evidence that the defendant had access to the plaintiff’s melody 
and copied it.204 The plaintiff consequently needs to adduce inde-
pendent evidence of access.205 Selle’s failure to adduce such evi-
dence doomed his suit to dismissal without a new trial.206
We believe that this ruling was unjustified. We are puzzled by 
the court’s attribution of musical minimalism and homogeneity to 
the entire pop genre. Any musical genre accommodates composi-
tions that occupy different positions on the originality spectrum. 
Some compositions score high on that spectrum, and some score 
low. The Bee Gees’ song “How Deep Is Your Love” scored low 
because its melody was similar to “Let It End.” Selle testified that 
“Let It End” was his original creation and Bee Gees did not dis-
pute it. Nor did the group advance a “prior common source” claim. 
Instead, it argued that “How Deep Is Your Love” is its independ-
ent creation. Because Selle’s song preceded that creation, its score 
on the originality spectrum was superior. Under the sameness rule, 
therefore, the case would go to trial. The Bee Gees would then 
have to prove their independent creation claim by clear and con-
vincing evidence. If they fail to do so, Selle would win the case. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. at 905. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. at 904–05. 
206 Id. at 905–06. 
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CONCLUSION 
Herman Melville famously observed that “it is better to fail in 
originality than to succeed in imitation.”207 This saying certainly 
captures a deep-seated human intuition. Throughout history, socie-
ties always had a special interest in original and highly creative 
works of art and expression. It is not surprising therefore that 
originality and creativity were selected as the gatekeepers of our 
copyright system. Yet, the existing copyright system does not use 
these two criteria properly. By assigning a very minimal role to 
these criteria, the system deprived society of a considerable expres-
sive wealth that could have been realized under a more efficient 
and just design.  
In this Article, we sought to remedy this design flaw by propos-
ing an originality-based framework for reshaping our copyright 
law. Our goal was to calibrate protection and liability to the level 
of originality of works. Instead of using originality and creativity as 
threshold requirements whose satisfaction makes an owner eligible 
for uniformly strong copyright protection, we utilized originality 
and creativity as continuums and varied the scope of rights and li-
abilities in accordance with a sliding originality scale. In so doing, 
we remained mindful of practicability constraints and supple-
mented our substantive legal mechanisms with evidentiary rules 
that should assist courts in implementing our proposal. We demon-
strated that an originality-based copyright system can help over-
come some of the main shortcomings of the current regime and 
lead to the production of more original and creative works. To re-
turn to Melville’s quote, many believe that the current copyright 
system “succeeds in imitation and fails in originality.” We pro-
posed a way to turn things around and put copyright law back on 
track. 
207 Herman Melville, Hawthorne and His Mosses, The Literary World, Aug. 17 & 24, 
1850, available at http://www.ibiblio.org/eldritch/nh/hahm.html. 
